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Collateral and its Determinants: Evidence from Vietnam 
















This paper analyses the determinants of collateral in loans granted to entrepreneurs and 
consumers. We use cross-sectional data on more than 39,000 bank loans raised by 
Vietnamese borrowers between 2006 and 2009. Our data set is unique because it contains 
information about the bank’s assessment of the borrower’s ex ante risk and the 
borrowers’ wealth including pledged as well as unpledged assets. We find that 
observationally riskier borrowers, as measured by the bank through the ex ante risk score, 
are more likely to pledge collateral. At the same time, wealthier borrowers are more 
likely to pledge collateral in order to benefit from a reduction in their interest costs. We 
also present evidence on other determinants of collateral such as borrower-lender 
relationship, credit market competition, and institutions.  
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1. Introduction 
Collateralization is believed to be a useful tool in resolving problems associated with 
both adverse selection and moral hazard in business and consumer lending. However 
what determines the use of collateral in credit contracts? Drawing from current theories, 
we examine this question empirically by modeling the use of collateral as a function of 
borrower characteristics such as credit quality, age, or wealth, loan characteristics such as 
loan amount and duration, the scale and scope of the borrower-lender relationship, credit 
market characteristics and regional governance conditions. We test this comprehensive 
model for the determinants of collateral using cross-sectional data on more than 39,000 
loans granted between 2006 and 2009 to Vietnamese retail borrowers for a wide range of 
purposes including commercial investment, consumer spending, and purchase of real-
estate.  
We find that the likelihood of pledging collateral is higher among borrowers who are 
observed by the bank as ex ante riskier borrowers. The bank uses a list of criteria to 
assess a loan application; these criteria are quantified into a risk score that can be used to 
distinguish risky borrowers from the safe ones. We find that the lower the risk score, the 
higher the probability of using collateral. This result confirms that observed risk matters 
in decisions about the term of a loan. We also find that among borrowers with the same 
level of observed risk, borrowers with higher wealth are more often using collateral.   
When adding interest rates to the analysis, our results suggest that borrowers reduce their 
funding costs by pledging collateral. 
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we use data on retail loans for which 
the borrowers’ liability is unlimited. Thereby, we can obtain new insights that differ 
from those papers that study corporate loans to borrowers with limited liability. Second, 
we use an ex ante credit risk variable which directly reflects how the bank observes a 
borrower’s credit profile. This allows us to better test the observed risk hypothesis than 
previous studies. Indeed, our results are consistent with the idea that observationally 
riskier borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral. Finally, we observe the 
borrower’s total wealth including assets pledged as collateral and unpledged assets. 
This allows us to investigate not only whether borrowers pledge collateral but also how 
much collateral they pledge relative to the size of the loan. Most importantly, however, 3 
 
by observing the value of the unpledged assets our study is the first to differentiate 
between the bank’s requirement to pledge collateral for risky borrowers and the 
borrowers’ ability to pledge collateral. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
existing theory and empirical evidence on the determinants of collateral use. Section 3 
provides background about the Vietnamese banking market. Section 4 presents our 
empirical model and derives our main hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data, variables, 
and method we use to test the main hypotheses. We present the results of our empirical 
analysis in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Theory 
Collateral is a defining feature of a loan contract, together with the interest rate, 
maturity, size, and any possible covenants. Drawing from current theories, collateral 
helps banks to solve two main problems. First, collateral can limit bank’s losses in the 
case of default by liquidating the collateral. Second, collateral can solve the problem of 
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers arising when borrowers own 
private information that is not available to banks. It is obvious how collateral works to 
solve the first problem. It is however more complex to understand how the later 
problem is solved by the use of collateral. Theories about collateral solving the 
asymmetric information problem can be divided into two main streams. First, collateral 
can be used as a signaling instrument providing banks with valuable information about 
the borrower’s quality that would not be available otherwise. High-quality borrowers 
who have private information about their good creditworthiness know that the chance 
of default on the loan and the loss of their collateral are unlikely. Therefore, high-
quality borrowers are more willing to pledge collateral in compensation of more 
favorable contract terms than low-quality borrowers. Hence, collateral helps reduce 
adverse selection by signaling (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; Chan and 
Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thako, 1987). In these papers a menu of contracts is 
offered to borrowers: one with high collateral and low interest rate and the other with 
low collateral and high interest rate. The borrowers can choose their preferred contract 4 
 
themselves and by choosing high collateral, they signal their status as high-quality 
borrowers. Second, collateral helps solve the problem of moral hazard after the loan is 
granted (Booth, Thakor and Udell, 1991). Collateral provides an incentive to borrowers 
to exert optimal effort or to invest the loan in appropriate investments as their payoff in 
the case of default is lower with collateral than without collateral. The presence of 
collateral is therefore associated with lower ex post default. In general, theories that 
view collateral as a solution to the asymmetric information problem predict a negative 
relation between presence of collateral and the borrower’s risk level, both ex ante and 
ex post. 
However, collateral requires monitoring and increases legal cost that might be high 
enough to offset any advantage of collateral for a bank in terms of lower loss given 
default and reduced asymmetric information. More importantly and contradictory to the 
arguments of the asymmetric information theories, there is a common view among 
bankers that collateral is associated with riskier borrowers (Berger and Udell, 1990; 
Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Inderst and Mueller, 2006). The rationale is that with their 
information obtained from ex ante screening, banks would be able to identify risky 
borrowers.  Since collateral helps to reduce the loss in case of default, bank would 
require more collateral from borrowers with higher default risk. This is commonly 
called the observed-risk hypothesis. 
 
2.2. Empirical evidence 
Although a substantial amount of empirical work is devoted to banking issues, there are 
only a limited number of studies investigating the determinants of collateral in bank 
loans. Moreover, this scarce empirical literature has not settled whether collateral is 
associated with riskier or safer borrowers. On one hand, empirical studies explains the 
use of collateral as a consequence of adverse selection (Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina, 
2006; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000), and/or moral hazard (Booth et al., 1991) and 
conclude that the presence of collateral is a signal of safe borrowers. On the other hand, 
the majority of studies find that collateral is associated with high risk borrowers and 
therefore support the observed-risk hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez and 
Saurina, 2004; Booth and Booth, 2006; Blazy and Weill, 2006). 5 
 
Among studies supporting the adverse selection theory, the most recent one is from 
Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) who analyze a wide range of determinants of the 
presence of collateral including credit quality of borrowers; competition in the credit 
market; borrower-lender relationship; loan characteristics; and macroeconomic 
conditions. Their findings are consistent with collateral as a solution to adverse 
selection problems, i.e. their results provide direct evidence of a negative association 
between collateral and borrower’s risk. They find that the possibility of using collateral 
to signal credit quality occurs mainly among young borrowers who have no previous 
record of financial or commercial activities. This is the group for which the asymmetric 
information effect is likely to be the strongest. Focusing on the associations between 
collateral, banking relationship and risk premium, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) 
find a negative link between the presence of collateral and the loan’s interest rate (a 
proxy for risk premium) for a sample of 18,000 Belgian loans. This indicates that less 
risky borrowers pledge collateral to signal their credit quality.  
The number of studies which find evidences supporting the observed-risk hypothesis, 
that is, a positive relation between the presence of collateral and the default risk, is 
substantial. In an early study Berger and Udell (1990) investigate the relationship 
between collateral and credit risk for a sample of one million loans from US banks. 
They test the hypothesis that adverse selection is the motive for collateralization by 
regressing the risk premium on a set of loan characteristics including a dummy variable 
considering whether the loan is secured or not. They find a positive and significant 
relationship between collateral and risk premium and conclude that the observed-risk 
hypothesis holds: Banks require more collateral from risky borrowers while at the same 
time charging them higher borrowing cost (higher risk premium). 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) investigate the wide range of determinants of the 
probability of default of bank loans by analyzing 3 million loans provided by Spanish 
banks. They use the probability of default as an ex-post credit risk measure. They test 
both hypothesizes of the asymmetric information theory: the presence of collateral 
helps limit adverse selection and reduce moral hazard. The ex post credit risk is 
regressed on a set of loan characteristics including information on collateral while 
controlling for other explanatory variables. They find a positive relation between the ex 6 
 
post credit risk and the presence of collateral which is in accordance with the observed-
risk hypothesis.  
Booth and Booth (2006) use a two-step regression to examine the relation between the 
borrowing cost and the presence of collateral on a sample of 977 US loans in the period 
from 1987 to 1989. They first examine the factors determining the presence of 
collateral to see whether the presence of collateral is a function of ex ante default risk 
and various controlling variables. They next examine the borrowing cost of secured and 
unsecured loans controlling for the interdependence between the decision to pledge 
collateral and loan spreads. They find that firms pledge collateral to minimize direct 
borrowing cost. Furthermore, in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis they find 
that a number of observable risk characteristics are related to the probability that a loan 
is secured.  Thus, their results confirm that the presence of collateral is associated with 
high risk borrowers.  
Blazy and Weill (2006) examine why banks require collateral, and whether their 
reasons vary among collateral types. Their study is among the very few that investigate 
simultaneously the role of collateral in reducing loss in case of the default and in 
solving the asymmetric information problem. Firstly, they run the regression of loan 
loss ratio on the presence of collateral with a set of possible explanatory variables. This 
loan loss ratio is defined as loan loss divided by loan amount. Loan loss is built using 
both actual recovered amounts and discounted expected amounts. They observe a 
negative coefficient which indicates that collateral helps reduce banks’ losses given 
default. Secondly they estimate a simultaneous equations model incorporating the 
interdependencies between risk premium and the collateral value. Their findings 
however indicate that information asymmetries are not of prime importance in the 
bank’s decision to secure a loan as they show a positive relation between collateral 
variables and risk premium. The reduction of the loan loss and the observed-risk 
hypothesis may thus explain the use of collateral. 
Liberty and Mian (2009) examine the use of collateral in emerging economies. They 
explore how the level of financial development in a country affects the collateral cost of 
capital using a novel cross-country data set containing small and medium business loans 
issued by a multinational bank in 15 emerging economies. They find that riskier firms in 7 
 
financially developed economies are able to access credit, pledging a lower amount of 
collateral and with greater flexibility in the type of assets they can offer as collateral. 
Their finding suggests a possible channel through which better financial and legal 
institutions expand credit to riskier firms. 
This review on the empirical literature leads to three main contributions of our paper. 
First, none of empirical studies investigates the use of collateral in retail loans, they all 
use loans granted to limited liability corporations. So our paper can shed a new light on 
studying the determinants of collateral for retail loans where the borrower is fully liable 
with all her wealth. Second, empirical studies mainly focus on developed countries 
where the financial system and the legal framework help provide more transparent 
information on credit history of borrowers and the information asymmetric therefore 
has less effect. In contrast our study focuses on the Vietnamese banking market, where 
institutional structures are largely lacking and information asymmetries are much more 
severe. Third, most of the existing papers use a proxy for ex ante credit risk observed 
by the bank such as borrowing rate or ex post default rate. In contrast, we are able to 
directly observe the borrower’s ex ante credit risk as we have access to the borrower’s 
credit score calculated by the bank at the time of the loan application. This allows us to 
better test the observed risk hypothesis than in the previous studies. 
 
3. The Vietnamese banking market 
In 1987, Vietnam started its transformation to a market economy. Part of this process is 
the replacement of the monopoly of state-owned banks by a two-level banking system 
consisting of a national central bank on one level and state-owned as well as commercial 
banks on another level.
1 Projects to modernize the inter-bank market, to create an 
international accounting system, and to allow outside audits of major Vietnamese banks 
are ongoing. However, the banking system continues to suffer from lack of capital, 
inadequate provisions for possible loan losses, low profitability, inexperience in capital 
                                                 
1  In 2005, this second level of the Vietnamese banking system contained five state-owned 
commercial banks, one social policy bank, 31 foreign bank branches, 40 foreign credit institution 
representative offices, five joint-venture commercial banks, 36 domestic joint-stock commercial 
banks, seven finance companies, and the Central People’s Credit Fund System with 23 branches 
and 888 local credit funds. 8 
 
markets, and the slow pace of institutional reform. With respect to risk assessment and 
management, there are numerous difficulties including a lack of transparency in non-
performing loan disclosure. In order to improve risk management in light of Basel II, 
Vietnam’s central bank has been reviewing its risk management regulations. As part of a 
broader strategy - which also addresses the banks’ business strategy, assets and liability 
management, and internal audit - all state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock 
commercial banks have been asked to develop a comprehensive credit manual which 
takes international practices in risk management into account. 
In this double-level banking system, the national central bank is not engaged any more in 
trading activities, nor is it directly involved in the process of acquiring or locating capital 
in the banking and financial market. All of those functions are carried out by commercial 
banks and other financial companies. These banks also provide banking services to 
corporations and individuals for profit including traditional services like payment 
transactions, deposit taking, lending, issuing credit and debit cards and modern services 
like internet banking. This second level is dominated by the state owned commercial 
banks, which accounted for almost of 80% of commercial bank operation in Vietnam in 
2005. However, despite the inadequacy of the legal framework and transitional problems, 
private commercial banks have made significant progress.  
The data used in this study originates from one of the joint-stock commercial banks in 
Vietnam. Sharing the common situation of all commercial banks in Vietnam, about 60 to 
70% of the bank’s capital asset is employed for lending activities. Profit from these 
activities accounts for a major part of bank’s total profit. Strategically the bank is focused 
on the retail sector, i.e. lending to consumers, entrepreneurs, and SMEs. During 
Vietnam’s recent period of high economic growth and transformation to a market 
economy, there has been an increasing demand of capital in this retail sector. Lending 
volumes have grown substantially since 1990 and although state owned enterprises are 
still the dominant users of credit, their share in bank credit fell from 86% in 1991-92 to 
58% in December 2005 due to growing loan demand from retail borrowers. Within the 
retail credit sector, joint stock commercial banks play an important role as they account 
for more than 50% of outstanding loan value.    9 
 
Due to its strategic focus on retail lending, the bank from which our data originates has 
developed competencies in particular regarding the risk assessment of borrowers during 
the initial screening. As a first step in the process of credit approval at the bank, 
borrowers have to fill in a loan application form. There they are asked to fill in their 
personal information (age, address, occupation, marital status, relation with any other 
bank, etc) as well as information about the loan that they are applying for (amount, 
purpose, etc). More importantly, the borrowers are also asked to provide information 
about their assets that can be pledged as collateral though they might not necessarily be 
used as collateral in the end. Second, all information provided by the borrowers is 
certified by the bank regarding its correctness. Third, because a sophisticated credit 
scoring system is not yet in place at the bank, rules of thumb are used. These take the 
form of a list of criteria that the credit officers can refer to. Generally, if the loan amount 
is less than 100 million Vietnamese dong (VND, approximately 3.000 euro) and all the 
criteria are met at the minimum required level then the loan application will be approved 
without requiring collateral. If the loan amount is more than 100 million VND all criteria 
will be assessed at a more critical level and a collateral requirement becomes more likely. 
The criteria that the bank uses to assess their borrowers include the borrower’s monthly 
income, her occupation, years with the current employer, the industry of occupation, etc. 
These criteria are combined into an ex ante risk score. For more detailed information 
about how this score is computed, please refer to Table A1 in the appendix. 
Table 1 provides a snapshot of part of the bank’s outstanding loan portfolio. Between 
2006 and 2009, the bank has extended 39.052 loans of which the majority finance 
consumer spending (55%). Overall 45% of these loans are collateralized with consumer 
and commercial loans showing the highest fraction of collateralization. The bank is free 
to decide on the interest it charges its borrowers and Table 1 reveals that the bank charges 
on average a lower interest rate for collateralized loans (15.1%) than for uncollateralized 
ones (22.3%). This is true for each loan purpose.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 10 
 
4. Empirical model and hypotheses 
We model collateral as determined by borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, the 
bank-borrower relationship and regional governance characteristics: 
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where collateralD,i is a dummy that takes the value of one if loan i is collateralized, and 
zero otherwise. To investigate how different determinants affect the requirement of 
collateral, we use probit regression to estimate the probability of a loan being secured by 
collateral. The probability of a loan being secured is given by: 
) ( ) 1 ( ob Pr
'X collateral D ∫
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∞ −
Φ = = β  (2) 
where  Φ is the standard normal distribution function and X is a vector of explanatory 
variables as listed in equation (1). Borrower characteristics include the borrower’s ex ante 
risk score, his wealth,  age and living comfort level. Loan characteristics include the 
duration of the loan, a large loanD dummy which indicates loans with a size larger than 
100 million VND, and dummies indicating the loan purpose as commercial, real estate, 
consumer or other. The bank-borrower relationship is measured by the years with the 
bank, the scope of the relationship as indicated by the number of bank products that the 
customer is using, the number of prior loans that the borrower obtained from the bank, 
and a dummy indicating if the customer has a business relationship with another bank 
(other bankD). Regional governance is characterized by the fraction of entrepreneurs in 
the provincial population, a provincial legal index and by the distance between the bank 
branch that makes the loan and the headquarter (distance to headquarter). As the bank 
requires borrowers to conduct business with their local branch, these governance proxies 
are measured for the province in which the branch and borrower are located. Finally, time 
dummies identify in which quarter of 2006 to 2009 the loan was signed. Details on these 
variables can be found in Table A2 in the appendix. Each of these variables will be 
motivated as we discuss our hypotheses below.  
 11 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Observed riskier borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral. 
Boot et al. (1991) find that when lenders based on their information regarding the credit 
quality of borrowers can differentiate high from low risk borrowers, high risk borrowers 
obtain loans with collateral and low risk borrowers obtain loans without having to pledge 
collateral. We can directly observe the ex ante risk score of each borrower’s credit 
quality as assessed by the bank. The higher the score, the lower the borrower’s credit risk. 
A positive coefficient for this proxy indicates that the observed-risk-hypothesis holds. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Given the same observed credit quality, wealthier borrowers are 
more likely to pledge collateral in order to benefit from a lower borrowing rate. 
This hypothesis is based on the argument that the use of collateral helps reduce 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders and that banks are more willing 
to grant secured loan with lower interest rate (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987a). Knowing that secured loans will be charged lower interest 
rate (see Table 1), borrowers who are able to pledge collateral have a strong incentive to 
do so. We proxy the ability to pledge collateral with the size of the borrower’s wealth. In 
addition, we consider the borrower’s living comfort level as an indicator of his wealth. 
Once the borrower fills in the loan application form, a credit officer will verify all the 
provided information and visit the borrower’s place of residence. The credit officer will 
then rank the living comfort of the borrower from luxury to poor based on established 
criteria including the neighborhood and number of bed rooms. In additional analyses, we 
also consider the impact of the interest rate on the collateral decision more directly. For 
each loan type and month of loan signing, we calculate the average interest rate across all 
unsecured loans minus the average interest rate across all secured loans. We then match 
this interest difference to each of our loan observations by loan time and month of loans 
signing. If the borrower has pledgable assets (wealth > 0), we set our interest benefit 
proxy equal to the interest difference. If the borrower does not have pledgable assets, we 
set our interest benefit proxy to zero. Thus, our proxy reflects the interest benefit that the 
borrower can potentially earn by pledging her assets as collateral. If interest rates are 
driving the borrower’s decision to pledge collateral then a higher interest benefit should 
increase the likelihood of collateral. 12 
 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a). The likelihood of using collateral decrease with length of 
borrower-lender relationship if the benefits of relationship lending dominates, and 
increase with the length of the relationship if the cost of the “hold-up” problem associated 
with the relationship lending dominates (scale of the relation). 
This hypothesis is based on studies about the effect of relationship lending on the 
likelihood of collateral (Boot, 2000; Berger and Udell, 2002, Jimenez et al, 2006). In 
addition, Boot et al. (1991) find that collateral can be a solution to problems of moral 
hazard and Boot and Thakor (1994) show that relationship lending can be viewed as a 
substitute for collateral in terms of reducing moral hazard as the repeated interaction 
between borrowers and lenders helps to build trust. In this case, years with bank should 
carry a negative coefficient. In contrast, a longer relationship can be associated with a 
higher likelihood of collateral use if longer-term relationships reflect more severe hold-up 
problems (Greenbaum et al, 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992, Farinha and Santos, 2002). 
Is so, the coefficient of years with bank should be positive. Additionally we use the 
number of prior loans as a proxy for the strength of the bank-borrower relationship. 
 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b). The likelihood of collateral use decreases with the number of 
different financial services that a borrower purchases from the bank. 
We base this hypothesis on a number of studies that investigate the relationship between 
the scale and scope of the lending relationship and the use of collateral (Degryse and 
Cayseele, 2000; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Chakraborty and Hu, 2000). While the scale 
of a lending relationship specifies the length of the relation between lenders and 
borrowers which we test with the above hypothesis, the scope of the lending relationship 
specifies number of different financial services that the borrowers uses. Lenders have 
access to private information when borrowers use non-loan financial services (such as 
checking accounts, saving accounts, or other financial services). This information can 
easily be quantified, transmitted, and combined with other available information to 
effectively assess different aspects of the borrower’s profile. An increased scope should 
therefore reduce the need for collateral. We measure the scope with the number of bank 
products used by the borrower. This proxy ranges from 0 to 4 and we predict a negative 
coefficient. 13 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The likelihood of using collateral increases with the competition 
among borrowers for loans. 
This hypothesis is on the argument that when there is competition among borrowers for 
loans, lenders have more bargaining power. Therefore to reduce their lost given default 
lenders would require more collateral. However, competition among borrowers for loans 
ultimately decreases the competition among lenders. Besanko and Thakor (1987) show 
that low competition among lenders increases the rents of lenders in all stages of the 
world. This suggests that the use of collateral is less likely with monopoly than 
competition. Following Malesky and Taussig (2008), we measure the fraction of 
entrepreneurs as the number of active legal entities per 1000 citizens in the borrower’s 
province. Here we assume that the number of citizens per province proxies for the 
lending resources assigned to that particular province and that more legal entities per 
1000 citizens imply more competition among borrowers for loans. This proxy should 
work as well for consumer loans as commercial loans can eat up the lending resource and 
leave only a small proportion to consumer loans.  We predict a positive coefficient for 
this proxy. 
In addition, we test another angle of the competition aspect, i.e. we consider whether or 
not the borrower has a relation with other banks. Other bankD can also be seen as a proxy 
for the competitiveness among lenders that would reduce the use of collateral. However, 
when the borrowers have more borrowing sources, this lack of exclusivity may reduce the 
quality of private information gathered by the banks (Thakor, 1996; Chakraborty and Hu, 
2000) which in turn would increase the use of collateral. The empirical result will tell us 
which of these two effects prevails in the data set. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (H5). A better legal environment will reduce the use of collateral. 
A better legal environment would give the lenders more power to pursue borrowers once 
they default and therefore reduce the incentive for borrowers to walk away from their 
loans (strategically default). The provincial legal index indicates whether the provincial 
legal framework appears to be transparent and supportive of enterprises. It is measured by 
five criteria: Whether the legal system provides mechanism for firms to appeal officials' 
corrupt behavior; whether the provincial government would uphold firm's contracts and 14 
 
property rights in a business dispute (firm confidence in legal institutions); whether firms 
rely on legal institutions to resolve dispute; number of law suit cases (where claimant was 
not SOE or foreign company) per 100 active Firms. The better the legal framework 
according to these criteria is the higher the value of the variable is. This indicates a 
negative coefficient. In contrast, if the legal environment is poor, the lender might not 
have any incentive to use collateral as the chance of recovering the collateral in case of 
default is low. In this case, the provincial legal index should be positively related to 
collateral. 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6). The use of collateral increases over the crisis period when 
uncertainty increases. 
It is commonly believed that uncertainty increases during a crisis. As we have been 
discussing, collateral helps to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard which 
increase with uncertainty. Therefore over a crisis period banks would require more 
collateral to help them overcome the increase in adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. We include quarterly dummy variables reflecting the loan signing date and we 
predict that the coefficients of quarterly dummy variables in 2008 and 2009 are positive 
while in the other years they are negative. 
 
In assigning control variables we include age of borrowers, loan’s duration, distance 
from the branch to headquarter, and large loan dummy which takes value of 1 if the loan 
amount is larger than 100 million VND and zero otherwise. The reason we are interested 
in the cut-off of 100 million VND is that it is used as a threshold by the bank to 
distinguish between small and large loans with different requirement for collateral.   
 
5. Data  
The data for our study were collected from one of the large commercial banks in 
Vietnam. The data set represents that part of the bank’s loan portfolio that was granted 
from June 2006 until March 2009 by all 163 branches of the bank in Vietnam.  
The data set consists of 51,161 loans given to borrowers with different purposes 
(commercial, real-estate, consumer, and other). Loans with commercial purpose refer to 15 
 
loans granted to independent entrepreneurs (typically fully-liable single-person or family 
businesses). Loans with real-estate purpose refer to loans that are used to buy a house or a 
piece of land. Loans for consumer purpose are those used to pay for living expenses, 
including marriage expenses, education, etc. There are a number of loans with unknown 
purpose. They are mainly loans to employees of the bank itself or to employees of other 
companies with guarantee from their employers. For these loans, purposes are not 
recorded in the system and therefore unknown in our data set. As Table 1 has shown 55% 
of the loans are loans for consumer purpose; 13% are loans for commercial purpose; 10% 
are for real-estate purpose. The rest which is 22% are un-known purpose.  Hence, our 
sample is dominated by consumer loans. Some borrowers take several loans at this bank, 
so our data set covers loans granted to 39,052 borrowers- implying that on average a 
borrower has 1.31 loans at the bank at that point in time. For borrowers with more than 
one loan, loans are aggregated to borrower level and the most recent loan is kept in the 
sample. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the explanatory variables of the model for 
all loans in Panel A and for collateralized versus uncollateralized loans in Panel B.  The 
ex ante risk score reveals that the bank focuses on relatively safe borrowers: The average 
score is 40 out of a maximum of 50. Collateralized loans are associated with on average 
riskier borrowers with a score of 38.58 compared to 40.67 for uncollateralized loans. This 
would support the observed risk hypothesis. The average wealth of a borrower is 869 
trillion VND but the differences between collateralized versus uncollateralized borrowers 
are substantial: 1,819 trillion VND versus 114 trillion VND. This supports the idea that 
borrowers provide collateral if they are able to – possibly in order to benefit from the 
lower interest rates documented in Table 1 for collateralized loans. The living comfort 
level proxy points into the same direction. Furthermore, collateralized loans have a longer 
duration, are more likely to be larger than 100 million VND, and are more likely made by 
a branch further away from the bank’s headquarter. Regarding the bank-borrower 
relationship, collateralized borrowers have a longer relationship, more prior loans, but use 
fewer different bank products and are less likely to have another banking relationship. 
Table 3 shows the number of observations over time. The number of new loans increases 
until the end of 2007 and then starts to drop. Compared to the fourth quarter of 2007, the 16 
 
number of new loans was 90% lower in the third quarter of 2008. By the first quarter of 
2009, loan volumes had recovered to 41% of the IV2007-level.  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
 
6. Results 
6.2. Empirical evidence regarding our main hypotheses 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the probit model estimations for all loans, commercial loans, 
real-estate loans, consumer loans, and other loans. The coefficient of the ex ante risk 
score is negative and significant in the estimations for all loans, commercial loans, and 
consumer loans thereby confirming H1. Thus borrowers with lower credit quality as 
observed by the bank are more likely to pledge collateral. For real-estate and other loans 
the coefficient insignificant. One can argue that the bank relies more on their general 
assessment criteria to judge a consumer and commercial loan as there the use of funds 
involve more uncertainty than real estate loans. With real-estate loans, the information 
about the real-estate itself also provide a piece of additional information to the bank about 
the borrowers. Other loans include loans to employees of the bank itself or guaranteed by 
the borrowers’ employer. With those loans, the bank can just make the decision 
independently from the general criteria as they have other sources of information to rely 
on. Thus our findings confirm the conclusion reached in previous studies (Berger and 
Udell, 1990, 1995; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Jimenez et al, 2006) that observed credit 
risk is the dominant factor in determining the use of collateral and that the higher risk 
observed by the bank the more collateral will be pledged. However the ex ante credit risk 
which reflects directly how the bank observes a borrower’s credit profile that we use in 
this paper to distinguish among borrowers of different observed credit quality allow a 
better test of the hypothesis than do the proxy variables used in the previous studies. 
Wealth has a positive and significant coefficient estimated for all loans except real estate 
loans. Thus the majority of the data confirms H2. Our finding confirms the conclusion of 
Booth and Booth (2006) that collateral pledging decisions are generally consistent with 
borrowing cost minimization. It has been an obstacle in studying collateral to distinguish 
between the willingness to pledge collateral and the ability to do so. However, using 
wealth we directly measure the borrower’s ability to pledge collateral and can thus test 17 
 
the hypothesis more accurately. Given the same level of observed credit risk, meaning the 
same requirement from the bank’s side to secure the loans, borrowers with ability to 
pledge in collateral will be more likely to do so to get the advantage on the lower 
borrowing rate for secured loans documented in Table 1. This finding is supported by the 
fact that the living comfort level behaves in the same way as wealth in the model. In 
contrast to wealth, however, the living comfort level is also significant for real estate 
loans. 
The length of the lending relationship measured by years with bank has positive and 
significant coefficient estimated for all different loan groups (H3a). This finding confirms 
that the “hold-up” effect dominates the benefit of the lending relationship and provides a 
direct support for the conclusion made in previous studies (Greenbaum et al., 1989; 
Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992, Farinha and Santos, 2002) that a longer duration of the 
lending relationship can be associated with higher likelihood of collateral use. To control 
for the fact that the borrowers with long lending relationships might be the “big” 
borrowers who tend to borrow loans with large amount and therefore being asked to 
secure their loan we test the impact of the interactive term between  loan size and the 
relationship duration, large loanD * years with bank. This interactive term has negative 
and significant coefficient estimated for all loans and the different loan types except other 
loans. Thus the hold-up effect of the lending relationship is generally less when the loans 
are larger. The second proxy for the lending relationship, number of prior loans, also has 
positive and significant coefficient estimated for all different groups of loan. This again 
confirms the hold-up effect increasing the incidence of collateral use with the scale of the 
relationship.  
The proxy for the scope of the lending relationship, number of bank products, has a 
negative and significant coefficient for all different types of loans. This confirms our 
hypothesis (H3b). This finding is consistent with the results found in the previous studies 
about the effect of scope of the lending relationship on collateral use (Degryse and 
Cayseele, 2000; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Chakraborty and Hu, 2000). Thus, while scale 
of the lending relationship increases the likelihood of using collateral, the scope, e.g. the 
number of different services that the borrowers use from the same bank, actually reduces 
the incidence of using collateral. The information the bank acquires from the borrowers 18 
 
through different kinds of services, for example different types of account such saving 
account, or debit account, helps the bank to monitor and assess different aspect of the 
borrowers. It reduces both adverse selection and moral hazard and therefore the bank 
requires less collateral. 
The fraction of entrepreneurs which proxies for the competition for loans has a positive 
and significant coefficient. This confirms our hypothesis (H4). Thus when borrowers 
have to compete for loans, banks have more bargaining power and are thus able to require 
collateral more frequently in order to cover their loss given default. This finding also 
indirectly provides evidence supporting the conclusion reached by Besanko and Thakor 
(1987) that the likelihood of using collateral decreases with the concentration in the credit 
market. 
Other bankD indicates if borrowers have a relationship with other banks and is used to 
test what impact of the existence of another potential lending source would have on the 
use of collateral. As we discussed in the hypothesis section this dummy can also be seen 
as a proxy for the competitiveness among lenders that would reduce the use of collateral. 
However this lack of exclusivity may reduce the quality of private information gathered 
by the banks (Thakor, 1996; Chakraborty and Hu, 2000) which in turn would increase the 
use of collateral. Other bankD has a negative coefficient for all types of loans, it is 
however not significant for commercial or consumer loans. Thus we can tentatively 
conclude that the existence of an alternative lending source to a borrower gives the bank 
a thread of competition and that it reduces the likelihood of using collateral.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5) is rejected as the coefficients the provincial legal index is significantly 
positive implying that a better legal environment increases the use of collateral. The 
insignificant coefficient for real-estate loans might indicate an interesting result. One can 
argue that a better legal environment actually reassures borrowers to pledge collateral. 
This should sound strange in a developed country but in a developing country such as 
Vietnam, the banking system is still quite concentrated and banks have substantial 
bargaining power over borrowers. Especially in case of default when the collateral is 
liquidized, banks have the power to decide how the collateral can be liquidized even at a 
disadvantage of the default borrowers. For example in liquidation, a collateralized asset is 
likely to be sold under value as banks do not have an incentive to exert any additional 19 
 
effort to sell the asset at a price beyond the value of the loan. With a better legal 
environment at least the borrowers can be reassured that they can have some legal 
support to be able to negotiate or to be involved in the deal in case of collateral 
liquidation. 
Our result confirms hypothesis 6 (H6) which predicts that the incidence of using 
collateral increases over the crisis periods. The last financial crisis started to show some 
impacts on the financial market in Vietnam at the beginning of 2008 and the empirical 
result shows that the coefficients of all quarterly dummy variables for 2008 and 2009 are 
positive and significant. With this result we can conclude that over crisis periods when 
uncertainty increases that makes adverse selection and moral hazard more severe bank 
would require more collateral as a solution for asymmetric information and reduce their 
lost in case of default. This is consistent with the result found by Jimenez et al. (2006). 
Note that significance pattern of the coefficients differs across the remaining loan types, 
i.e. commercial, consumer and real estate loans show significantly less collateralization 
before the crisis. Finally, borrowers of other loans always seem to hold more collateral.
2 
The remaining control variables indicate that the larger the loan amount and the longer 
the loan duration, the more likely it is that collateral will be used, especially when the 
loan amount exceeds 100 million VND. The coefficients of age of the borrowers are 
positive and significant for all loan groups. This aligns with findings by Jimenez et al 
(2009). It however differs from Berger and Udell (1995), who find a negative effect of 
borrower age in the likelihood of collateral use. Distance to headquarter is also 
controlled for but does not have any significant impact on collateralization. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Panel B of Table 4 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of collateralization 
for a one-standard deviation change in each independent continuous variable or for a 
change from 0 to 1 for each independent dummy variable. The results are reported for the 
regression on ‘all loans’ in Panel A. Overall, the model predicts that 48.4% of loans are 
collateralized which is close to the sample frequency of 45%. The largest impact on 
                                                 
2 The other loan type shows results that are generally different from the remaining loan types. 
This is not surprising as these borrowers are either bank employees or have their loan guaranteed 
by an affiliated company. In the final version of this study we plan to explore this group and its 
special characteristics in more depth. 20 
 
collateralization can be observed for the number of bank products (-72%) followed by 
large loansD (+36%). The effect of the ex ante risk score is only moderate with -3.2%. 
This can however be explained with the relatively low variability of the score as reported 
in Panel A of Table 2 and the similarity of the average scores for collateralized and 
uncollateralized loans as reported in Panel B of Table 2. The effect of the crisis also 
becomes clear: In 2008 and 2009 the probability of collateralization increased between 
11.1% and 33.0% compared to the third quarter of 2006. In conclusion, the estimated 
coefficients of our model reported in Panel A generally imply an economically 
substantial impact of the significant borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, bank-
borrower relationships, and regional governance features on the use of collateral. 
 
6.2. Additional analyses of the collateralization decision 
We wish to provide more detailed results regarding the interest cost driven motivation of 
pledging collateral and regarding the value of the pledged assets. 
First, the results in Table 5 provide additional support for the interest-rate driven 
motivation of borrowers to pledge collateral. When we introduce into our regressions the 
interest benefit that a borrower with collateralizable assets can gain, we find positive and 
significant coefficients. The coefficients of wealth remain significantly positive while the 
significance of the living comfort level effect is somewhat reduced. Overall this indicates 
that borrowers who have assets at their disposal are inclined to pledge them as collateral 
and this inclination rises as the associated interest rate benefit increases. In economic 
terms the effect is substantial. For all loans, an increase in interest benefit by one standard 
deviation around the mean is associated with an increase in the likelihood of collateral by 
26.49% (from 33.65% to 60.14%). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second in Table 6, we explore the amount of collateral provided borrowers using the 
same set of explanatory variables as used in Table 4. We focus on our combined sample 
of all loan types. As we include collateralized and uncollateralized loans, we estimate 
tobit regressions which take the left censoring of our dependent variables at zero into 
account.  21 
 
We measure the value of collateral in absolute as well as relative terms. We start with the 
ratio of collateral value to loan amount as our first proxy. In order to reduce the impact of 
outliers, i.e. loans with very high collateral to loan value ratio, we also use the natural log 
of this ratio and a collateral index based this ratio. Finally, we use the nominal value of 
the collateral itself. From Table 6, we conclude that the factors that determine whether or 
not collateral is provided also affect the amount of collateral. The sign and significance of 
the coefficients match those reported in Table 4. Exceptions are the dummies for large 
loans. Not surprisingly, we find that larger loans have collateral which has a high 
absolute value but low value relative to the size of the loan. The most interesting results 
in this table are the coefficients of the time dummies which clearly show that both the 
absolute as well as the relative value of the collateral increases as the crisis approaches. 
Compared to the third quarter of 2006, collateral values increase until the third quarter of 
2008 before dropping again. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper we present an empirical analysis of the determinants of collateralization of 
retail loans. We focus our analysis on six main hypotheses and test these using a unique 
data set at loan of loans originated by a large commercial bank in Vietnam between 2006 
and 2009.  
Previous empirical research shows that lenders require collateral for loans granted to 
borrowers with lower credit quality. The results in our paper are based on a direct 
measure of credit risk as observed by the bank and confirm that the observed credit 
quality of the borrower is an important determinant of the use of collateral. In addition, 
we find that wealthier borrowers who are able to pledge collateral do so to benefit from 
low borrowing rates. We also find that the hold-up effect dominates the benefit of 
relationship lending in terms of a higher likelihood of collateral in new loans. However, 
the scope rather than scale of the borrower-lender relationship actually improves the 
terms of the loan contract as the usage of collateral decrease. Finally, the likelihood of 
using collateral is higher in credit markets where borrowers have to compete more for 22 
 
funds. Additionally, we find that over crisis periods when uncertainty increases and 
lending resources are limited, collateralization also increases.  
Overall, our findings for Vietnam as a developing banking market are to in parts 
consistent with existing evidence from developed markets. Our analysis however also 
reveals new results regarding the willingness and ability of borrowers to pledge collateral 
which have not yet been documented for developed or developing banking markets. 
These findings offer ample opportunities for future research. 
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number of loans signed 2006‐2009 39,052 5,226 3,784 21,376 8,666
fraction of collateralized loans 45.0% 26.5% 16.8% 50.5% 6.2%
average value of collateral in collateralized loans
collateral to loan value ratio 6.4 5.0 3.1 8.3 4.7
collateral value (bn VND) 1.3 1.3 2.0 1.0 0.9
average interest rate
uncollateralized loans 22.3% 20.8% 21.2% 22.4% 22.4%










Ex ante risk score 40.00 5.00 15.00 50.00 39,052
Wealth (bn VND) 0.87 2.34 0.00 134.00 39,052
Age (years) 38.00 10.00 20.00 87.00 39,052
Living comfort level 1.10 0.00 1.00 3.00 39,052
Interest benefit (0.01=1%) 0.03 0.05 ‐0.15 0.17 39,052
Loan characteristics
Duration (years) 3.33 2.75 0.08 30.00 39,052
Large loanD 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 39,052
Bank‐borrower relationship
Years with bank 1.52 2.04 0.00 8.00 39,052
Number of prior loans 0.95 4.58 0.00 423.00 39,052
Number of bank products 2.78 1.57 0.00 4.00 39,052
Other bankD 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 39,052
Regional governance
Provincipal legal index 4.08 0.51 0.00 6.55 39,052
Distance to headquarter (km) 22.00 112.00 0.00 1,024.00 38,980












Ex ante risk score 38.58 4.97 17,377 40.67 5.07 21,675
Wealth (tr VND) 1,810.00 3,160.00 17,377 114.00 761.00 21,675
Age (years) 43.11 9.96 17,377 34.77 8.55 21,675
Living comfort level 1.18 0.56 17,377 1.04 0.26 21,675
Interest benefit (0.01=1%) 0.06 0.05 17,377 0.00 0.01 21,675
Loan characteristics
Duration (years) 4.10 3.75 17,377 2.70 1.27 21,675
Large loanD 0.64 0.48 17,377 0.14 0.35 21,675
Bank‐borrower relationship
Years with bank 2.15 2.19 17,377 1.01 1.75 21,675
Number of prior loans 1.89 6.25 17,377 0.19 2.30 21,675
Number of bank products 1.29 1.20 17,377 3.97 0.33 21,675
Other bankD 0.09 0.29 17,377 0.15 0.35 21,675
Regional governance
Provincipal legal index 4.10 0.45 17,377 4.07 0.56 21,675
Distance to headquarter (km) 13.74 89.33 17,344 29.31 126.64 21,636

























Intercept ‐0.41 ‐3.45 1.36 ‐0.73 ‐2.97 **
‐0.58 ‐1.43 1.15 ‐0.55 ‐2.62
Borrower characteristics
Ex ante risk score ‐0.02 *** ‐0.03 ** 0.00 ‐0.02 *** 0.00
‐5.08 ‐2.31 ‐0.14 ‐4.62 ‐0.30
Wealth 0.17 *** 0.03 * 0.06 0.17 *** 1.21 ***
4.41 1.92 1.13 3.91 11.95
Age  0.02 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 ***
10.71 6.71 2.46 10.54 4.81
Living comfort level  0.22 *** 0.17 * 0.42 *** 0.21 * 0.24 **
2.45 1.72 3.10 1.84 1.97
Loan characteristics
Duration 0.01 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 *** ‐0.06 ***
1.20 2.53 5.69 3.93 ‐3.13
Large loanD 0.94 *** 1.96 *** 2.32 *** 1.10 *** 0.66 ***








Years with bank  0.25 *** 0.41 *** 0.30 *** 0.28 *** 0.14 ***
19.46 7.35 3.61 15.79 6.94
Years with bank * Large LoanD ‐0.12 *** ‐0.28 *** ‐0.18 ** ‐0.17 *** ‐0.03
‐5.72 ‐4.90 ‐2.13 ‐7.98 ‐0.87
Number of prior loans 0.05 *** 0.22 *** 0.30 *** 0.03 * 0.07 **
4.30 5.41 4.63 1.72 2.11
Number of bank products ‐1.37 *** ‐1.66 *** ‐1.49 *** ‐1.34 *** ‐0.94 ***
‐23.63 ‐13.37 ‐14.18 ‐22.81 ‐8.27
Other bankD ‐0.36 *** ‐0.24 ‐0.77 *** ‐0.16 ‐0.42 ***
‐2.97 ‐1.28 ‐3.57 ‐1.04 ‐4.46
Regional governance
Fraction of entrepreneurs 0.34 *** 1.06 *** ‐0.21 * 0.39 ** 0.28 ***
4.31 2.92 ‐1.69 2.03 2.93
Provincial legal index  0.29 *** 0.66 ** 0.26 0.34 ** 0.32
3.08 2.12 1.25 1.99 1.38
Distance to head‐quarter ‐0.00 0.00 ‐0.00 * 0.00 0.00
‐1.15 0.10 ‐1.79 ‐0.59 ‐0.38
Time dummies
IV‐2006 ‐0.45 ** ‐0.08 ‐0.69 *** ‐0.74 ** ‐0.77
‐2.03 ‐0.34 ‐1.80 ‐2.29 ‐1.36
I‐2007 ‐0.16 ‐0.10 ‐0.62 ‐0.43 * 0.52 **
‐0.88 ‐0.49 ‐1.25 ‐1.75 1.97
II‐2007 ‐0.10 ‐0.71 *** ‐0.83 *** ‐0.20 0.53 *
‐0.85 ‐2.55 ‐2.46 ‐1.19 1.85
III‐2007 ‐0.26 *** ‐1.17 *** ‐0.95 *** ‐0.31 ** 0.54 *
‐2.58 ‐5.11 ‐3.19 ‐2.39 1.88
IV‐2007 ‐0.14 ‐0.48 * ‐0.76 *** ‐0.22 * 0.37
‐1.22 ‐1.76 ‐2.53 ‐1.89 1.09
I‐2008 0.28 * ‐0.06 ‐0.89 *** 0.12 1.33 ***
1.85 ‐0.19 ‐2.70 0.71 4.63
II‐2008 0.90 *** ‐0.23 ‐0.50 0.53 *** 2.16 ***
6.54 ‐0.72 ‐1.08 2.67 7.21
III‐2008 0.77 *** ‐0.20 ‐0.22 3.53 ***
2.68 ‐0.40 ‐0.81 10.52
IV‐2008 0.63 *** 0.09 ‐0.16 ‐0.12 2.54 ***
2.99 0.40 ‐0.34 ‐0.52 7.80
I‐2009 0.40 ** ‐1.02 *** ‐0.96 * ‐0.05 2.16 ***
2.10 ‐3.52 ‐2.69 ‐0.24 7.39
log likelihood ‐3,990.2 ‐225.8 ‐190.1 ‐2,044.4 ‐665.9
pseudo R
2 0.851 0.882 0.906 0.858 0.796
number of observations 38,977 5,221 3,760 21,320 8,662
Note: This panel shows the result of a probit regression estimation. The dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one for a collateralized loans and zero otherwise. For each independent variable,
the first rowshows theestimated coefficientand the second rowthe z‐statistic. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank branch. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 















Ex ante risk score 50.0% 46.8% ‐3.2%
Wealth  40.4% 56.5% 16.0%
Age  44.0% 52.9% 8.9%
Living comfort level  46.5% 50.3% 3.7%
Loan characteristics
Duration 47.6% 49.2% 1.6%
Large loanD 35.3% 71.2% 36.0%
Commercial loanD 44.2% 74.1% 29.9%
Real estate loanD 45.8% 71.9% 26.1%
Other loanD 42.3% 69.0% 26.7%
Bank‐borrower relationship
Years with bank  38.3% 58.7% 20.4%
Years with bank * Large LoanD 52.4% 44.4% ‐8.0%
Number of bank products 85.1% 13.1% ‐72.0%
Number of prior loans 43.8% 53.1% 9.3%
other bankD 50.1% 36.2% ‐13.9%
Regional governance
Fraction of entrepreneurs 43.9% 52.9% 9.1%
Provincial legal index  45.6% 51.2% 5.7%
Distance to head‐quarter 49.7% 47.1% ‐2.6%
Time dummies
IV‐2006 49.3% 32.1% ‐17.3%
I‐2007 48.7% 42.3% ‐6.5%
II‐2007 48.7% 44.5% ‐4.1%
III‐2007 49.8% 39.7% ‐10.1%
IV‐2007 49.7% 44.1% ‐5.6%
I‐2008 46.5% 57.6% 11.1%
II‐2008 45.5% 78.6% 33.0%
III‐2008 47.8% 76.1% 28.3%
IV‐2008 46.7% 70.6% 23.9%
I‐2009 47.0% 62.7% 15.7%
overall predicted probability of collateral 48.4%
fraction of collateralized loans in sample 45.0%
Note: This panel shows the effectof achange ina the independent
variable from half a standard deviation below the mean to half a
standard deviation above the mean on the predicted probability of
collateral. If the independent variable is a dummy, achange from0
to 1 is considered. All other independentvariables are kept attheir
mean values. The results reported in this panel refer to the
regression for 'all loans' in Panel A. The overall predicted







Intercept 0.11 ‐4.16 * 0.46 0.96 ‐3.27 ***
0.14 ‐1.87 0.24 0.79 ‐2.59
Borrower characteristics
Ex ante risk score ‐0.01 *** ‐0.03 * 0.03 * ‐0.01 ** ‐0.01
‐3.57 ‐1.85 1.81 ‐2.31 ‐0.74
Wealth 0.13 *** 0.03 ** 0.01 0.11 *** 0.82 ***
4.50 2.09 0.49 3.41 2.97
Age  0.02 *** 0.04 *** 0.02 * 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
7.72 5.61 1.76 7.17 3.38
Living comfort level  0.19 ** 0.13 0.24 0.17 0.23 *
2.00 1.10 1.42 1.58 1.64
Interest rate benefit 14.71 *** 13.31 *** 31.31 *** 20.45 *** 13.70 ***
19.60 7.77 11.13 13.13 10.86
Loan characteristics
Duration 0.01 0.13 *** 0.05 *** 0.12 *** ‐0.05 ***
1.39 3.43 3.57 5.13 ‐3.12
Large loanD 0.79 *** 1.97 *** 3.00 *** 0.95 *** 0.67 ***








Years with bank  0.26 *** 0.44 *** 0.31 *** 0.31 *** 0.13 ***
16.70 7.42 5.31 14.81 6.22
Years with bank * Large LoanD ‐0.12 *** ‐0.30 *** ‐0.19 *** ‐0.19 *** ‐0.02
‐4.97 ‐4.77 ‐2.64 ‐8.94 ‐0.36
Number of prior loans 0.04 *** 0.22 *** 0.26 *** 0.02 0.05
4.00 5.88 3.33 1.55 1.60
Number of bank products ‐1.32 *** ‐1.69 *** ‐1.49 *** ‐1.25 *** ‐0.82 ***
‐21.83 ‐14.01 ‐14.47 ‐17.33 ‐8.21
Other bankD ‐0.25 ** ‐0.29 ‐0.78 *** ‐0.03 ‐0.26 ***
‐2.14 ‐1.60 ‐2.48 ‐0.18 ‐2.49
Regional governance
Fraction of entrepreneurs 0.28 *** 1.09 *** ‐0.20 0.21 0.28 ***
3.39 3.36 ‐0.83 1.17 2.50
Provincial legal index  0.14 0.80 *** 0.19 ‐0.07 0.32
1.33 2.51 0.98 ‐0.45 1.26
Distance to head‐quarter 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
‐0.57 ‐0.28 ‐0.68 0.93 ‐0.43
Time dummies
log likelihood ‐3,319.0 ‐195.7 ‐106.7 ‐1,556.2 ‐585.5
pseudo R
2 0.876 0.897 0.947 0.892 0.820
number of observations 38,977 5,221 3,760 21,320 8,662
Other loans 
Note: This table shows the result of a probit regression estimation. The dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one for a collateralized loans and zero otherwise. For each independent variable,
the first rowshows theestimated coefficientand thesecond rowthe z‐statistic. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by bank branch. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 












Intercept ‐21.40 *** ‐1.62 *** ‐1.91 *** ‐2.48 ***
‐5.51 ‐3.78 ‐3.06 ‐6.82
Borrower characteristics
Ex ante risk score ‐0.03 ** 0.00 ** ‐0.01 *** 0.00
‐2.16 ‐2.22 ‐2.88 0.01
Wealth 1.06 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.62 ***
7.05 7.76 7.97 14.10
Age  0.16 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01 ***
11.51 11.44 10.63 4.12
Living comfort level  0.27 0.07 *** 0.15 *** 0.11 ***
1.33 2.85 3.82 3.42
Loan characteristics
Duration ‐0.14 *** ‐0.01 *** ‐0.01 0.03 ***
‐4.13 ‐3.02 ‐0.86 6.03
Large loanD ‐2.07 *** ‐0.09 ** 0.26 *** 0.37 ***
‐6.29 ‐2.00 3.74 10.50
Commercial loanD ‐0.53 * 0.02 0.20 *** 0.14 ***
‐1.86 0.48 3.24 3.88
Real estate loanD ‐0.82 *** ‐0.14 *** ‐0.02 0.18 ***
‐3.01 ‐3.64 ‐0.37 3.41
Other loanD ‐0.74 ‐0.07 0.01 0.02
‐0.49 ‐0.37 0.02 0.10
Bank‐borrower relationship
Years with bank  1.19 *** 0.16 *** 0.27 *** 0.13 ***
7.29 9.91 13.46 6.78
Years with bank * Large LoanD ‐0.03 0.00 ‐0.02 * ‐0.02 *
‐0.48 ‐0.16 ‐1.63 ‐1.79
Number of prior loans 0.13 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.00
3.30 3.57 3.67 0.33
Number of bank products ‐5.38 *** ‐0.74 *** ‐1.22 *** ‐0.62 ***
‐19.13 ‐25.04 ‐27.79 ‐14.24
Other bankD ‐1.73 *** ‐0.21 *** ‐0.32 *** ‐0.16 ***
‐4.07 ‐4.26 ‐3.81 ‐3.34
Regional governance
Fraction of entrepreneurs 2.85 *** 0.33 *** 0.50 *** 0.19 ***
4.99 5.16 5.44 2.76
Provincial legal index  2.85 *** 0.33 *** 0.53 *** 0.27 ***
5.76 6.07 6.49 4.51
Distance to head‐quarter ‐0.01 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
‐3.42 ‐3.44 ‐3.12 ‐2.72
Time dummies
IV‐2006 ‐0.32 ‐0.04 ‐0.05 ‐0.03
‐0.67 ‐0.59 ‐0.45 ‐0.60
I‐2007 0.44 0.05 0.05 0.10
0.93 0.75 0.43 1.40
II‐2007 0.93 * 0.10 * 0.15 * 0.26 ***
1.91 1.91 1.65 3.70
III‐2007 0.80 * 0.06 0.02 0.23 ***
1.83 1.07 0.20 4.25
IV‐2007 0.80 * 0.06 0.01 0.25 ***
1.71 1.02 0.12 4.24
I‐2008 2.00 *** 0.22 *** 0.27 *** 0.38 ***
4.01 3.57 2.48 7.01
II‐2008 3.63 *** 0.42 *** 0.61 *** 0.54 ***
6.10 6.42 6.04 6.41
III‐2008 5.07 *** 0.58 *** 0.92 *** 0.26 **
3.62 3.40 3.05 2.24
IV‐2008 3.66 *** 0.42 *** 0.60 *** 0.36 ***
5.60 5.29 4.82 4.88
I‐2009 2.87 *** 0.34 *** 0.48 *** 0.32 ***
5.28 4.94 4.15 4.59
log likelihood ‐67,300.0 ‐28,100.0 ‐35,500.0 ‐31,500.0
pseudo R
2 0.504 0.670 0.716 0.700
number of observations 38,977 38,977 38,977 38,977
Note: This table shows the result of a tobit regression estimation on a sample combining all
loan types. For each independent variable, the first row shows the estimated coefficient and
the second row the t‐statistic. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by



































Notes: To calculate the ex ante risk score, all points are added up. A higher score
indicates lower risk.
Years in current 
employment/business
Industry where the loan 
will be invested in 
Years of education
Industry in which 
borrower is engaged
Monthly Income
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Table A2: Variable sources and definitions
Category Variable Definition
Dependent variable CollateralD Dummy equal to one for collateralized loans, zero otherwise.
Collateral to loan value ratio Value of collateral divided by the loan amount.
ln(collateral to loan value 
ratio)
Logarithm of collateral to loan value ratio.
Collateral index Index based on collateral to loan value ratio (CLR): 0 if unsecured; 
index=1 if 0<CLR<1 ; index=2 if 1<= CLR <1.5; index=3 if 1.5< =CLR<5; and 
index=4 if CLR>=5.
Collateral value Value of collateral in billion VND, missing  for non‐collateralized loans.
Borrower characteristics Ex ante risk score Score assigned to borrower during initial screening process. Range from 
0 to 50 with higher value indicating lower risk.
Wealth  Total wealth of borrower in billion of VND. Wealth refers to assets and 
includes real estate, automobile, or machines.
Age  Age of borrower in years.
Living comfort level  Index measuring how comfortable the borrower's living environment is. 
This index ranges from 1 to 3 with higher value indicating higher comfort 
levels.
Interest rate benefit First, an interest rate difference is calculated as the average interest rate 
of all unsecured loans minus the average interest rate of all secured 
loans. This differences calculated separately for each loan type and each 
month of loan signing. Second, for each loan observation the relevant 
interest rate difference is identified based on loan type and month of 
loan signing. If the borrower has pledgable assets, the interest benefit is 
set equal to this interest rate difference. if the borrower does not have 
pledgable asset, the interest benefit is set equal to zero.
Loan characteristics Duration Loan maturity in years
Large loanD Dummy equal to one for loans with size larger than 100 million VND.
Commercial loanD Dummy equal to one for loan used by entrepreneur for business 
purposes, zero otherwise.
Real estate loanD Dummy equal to one for loan used by entrepreneur or consumer to 
purchase real estate, zero otherwise.
Consumer loanD Dummy equal to one for loan used by consumer to fund consumer 
spending including living expenses, school tuition, marriage cost, health 
care expenses, zero otherwise.
Other loanD Dummy equal to one for loan used by other retail borrower, zero 
otherwise. This category includes loans to employees of the bank and its 
affiliates.
Bank‐borrower relationship Years with bank  Years since the first business contact / loan / account with the bank.
Number of prior loans Number of prior loans that the customer has had with the bank.
Number of bank products Number of different bank products that the customer uses with the 
bank. This includes saving accounts, debit account, prepaid card, and 
credit card.
Other bankD dummy equal to one if the borrower indicated to the lender that she is 
holding accounts with another bank.
Regional governance Fraction of entrepreneurs Number of entrepreneurs per 1000 inhabitants, measured at provincial 
level. Source:  General Statistical Office's Enterpreprise Census in 2005 ‐ 
GSO (2005).
Provincial legal index  Index measuring how transparent and supportive the provincial legal 
framework appears to be to the enterprises. Scale from 0 to 10 with 
higher values indicating better legal framework. Source: Provincial 
Competitiveness Index‐ PIC‐ Survey instrument and methodology can be 
obtained at http://www.pcivietnam.org.
Distance to headquarter Distance in km between branch and bank headquarters.
Note: Unless otherwise indicated, the sources for all variables are the bank's confidential records about the borrower.  
 